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We examine the interbank market in Japan during the 1997–98
banking crisis. We find almost no relationships between borrower risk
and borrowing terms in the pre-crisis period. In contrast, we find that
riskier banks borrowed less from the interbank market during the crisis
period. These results suggest that lenders became highly sensitive to
borrower risk, and thus, counterparty risk played a key role in disrupting
the interbank market during the crisis.
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1 Introduction
Interbank markets play a key role in enhancing the efficiency of
financial systems. They contribute in the smooth transfer of liquidity
from banks having a surplus to those with a deficit. They also
facilitate imposition of discipline on bank managements, because banks
are sufficiently informed to monitor their peers effectively. Support for
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this view is found in studies on microdata related to the US interbank
market (Furfine, 2001; King, 2008). These studies find that high-risk
banks pay higher interest rates on interbank loans and rely less on
interbank borrowing.
However, the 2007–08 financial crisis casts doubt on the viability and
robustness of interbank markets. As the US subprime crisis developed
into a global financial crisis, the US and Euro area interbank markets
plunged into turmoil; interest rates rose to unprecedented levels, and
trading activity declined significantly. Many banks faced difficulty in
obtaining sufficient funds from interbank markets (Brunnermeier, 2009;
Heider et al., 2015). These phenomena indicate disruptions in interbank
markets.
There are two alternative theories that explain why interbank markets
do not function well during crises. Some papers emphasize the role of
counterparty risk. Flannery (1996) and Heider et al. (2015) argue that
crises cause serious information asymmetry between interbank lenders
and borrowers, and hence, lenders cannot then properly assess borrower
risk. Furfine (2001) provides a different view of the role of counterparty
risk. He does not assume that serious information asymmetry occurs
during crises. Instead, he argues that interbank lenders become
highly sensitive to borrower risk and require an exceptionally high
risk premium such that high-risk banks cannot borrow from interbank
markets. Other papers emphasize the role of liquidity hoarding for
precautionary reasons in disrupting interbank markets (Allen et al.,
2009). They argue that banks hoard liquidity in response to increased
uncertainty about liquidity shocks during crises. Thus, interbank
lenders do not grant loans even to low-risk banks.
A growing body of empirical research uses microdata to determine
how interbank markets function during financial crises. Furfine (2002)
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evaluates the performance of the overnight federal funds market during
the crisis in autumn 1998, which saw the near collapse of the hedge
fund firm, Long-Term Capital Management. He finds no adverse
effects on loan spreads and lending volumes and concludes that the
federal funds market performed well during the crisis. Acharya and
Merrouche (2013) study the UK interbank market during the 2007–08
crisis. They find that high-risk banks or those with a high exposure to
liquidity shocks held more liquidity during the crisis. They also report
that liquidity hoarding caused overnight interbank rates to rise even
for low-risk banks. Their findings lend support to the argument that
liquidity hoarding is an important factor in the disruption of interbank
markets. Afonso et al. (2011) explore how the overnight federal funds
market was affected by the failure of Lehman Brothers on September
2008. They find that immediately after this failure, the amount and
spread of interbank borrowing became more sensitive to borrower risk,
especially for large banks. Thus, riskier banks borrowed less and paid a
higher spread. They also find that the increased sensitivity of loan terms
to borrower risk returned to the pre-crisis levels when the American
International Group (AIG) bailout was announced. These findings are
consistent with the counterparty risk hypothesis proposed by Furfine
(2001). In contrast to Acharya and Merrouche (2013), they find no
evidence of liquidity hoarding by banks during a crisis. Specifically,
they find that even riskier banks, which should have faced difficulty
in interbank borrowing, did not reduce their interbank lending levels.
Angelini et al. (2011) examine interbank transactions between Italian
banks participating in the electronic market for interbank deposits,
or e-MID. They observe that longer-term loan spreads became more
sensitive to borrower risk during the 2007–08 crisis, a result similar to
that of Afonso et al. (2011).
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In summary, previous studies that examine why and to what extent
interbank markets fail to function during crises obtained mixed results,
and further empirical research is needed to clarify this disruption.
It is particularly important for policymakers to understand whether
disruptions in interbank markets are driven by liquidity hoarding or
counterparty risk. If liquidity hoarding plays a key role in such
disruptions, liquidity provision by central banks would be an effective
way to restore the functioning of interbank markets. However, if
counterparty risk plays a key role, such liquidity provision would be
insufficient to resolve the problem. Instead, the government would need
to address concerns about borrower risk through interventions such as
capital injections into troubled banks.
We investigate the interbank market in Japan during the 1997–98
banking crisis. Most previous studies focus on the US and European
interbank markets during the 2007–08 financial crisis. However, it is
important for policymakers to clarify whether the findings of such
studies are valid in relation to other crises. In this regard, our
investigation allows us to verify whether these findings are robust.
Moreover, the interbank market in Japan has a unique feature: it
has many regional banks that do not engage in interbank borrowing
but are active interbank lenders. These regional banks, which are
located in areas with low business activity, have more deposits than
loans. Their abundant liquidity enables them to avoid interbank
borrowing, and they are not affected by uncertainty about liquidity
shocks in the interbank market. Comparing these regional banks to
other banks allows us to clarify the importance of liquidity hoarding
in the disruption of interbank markets. We also analyze the effects of
interventions by the authorities during the crisis. In order to address
the crisis, the Japanese government guaranteed the safety of interbank
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transactions and injected capital into banks, while the Bank of Japan
(BOJ) pumped massive liquidity into the interbank market. Analyzing
the effects of these interventions is not only important for policymakers,
but also helps us identify the source of the disruption of interbank
markets.
We find almost no relationships in the pre-crisis period between
borrower risk and borrowing terms such as the amount borrowed and
the borrowing spread. In contrast, we find that riskier banks borrowed
less from the interbank market during the crisis period. These results
suggest that lenders could discriminate between high- and low-risk banks
even during the crisis and that they became more sensitive to borrower
risk. Our finding is consistent with the counterparty risk hypothesis
proposed by Furfine (2001), who argues that an increase in lender
sensitivity to borrower risk leads to disruptions in interbank markets.
We find no evidence of liquidity hoarding by banks. The amount
lent was not constrained by lenders’ liquidity or their dependence on
interbank borrowing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the interbank market and the 1997–98 banking crisis in Japan. Section
3 explains the data and methods used in our analysis, and Section 4
presents the results. Section 5 describes the robustness checks and offers
a discussion of the study results. Section 6 presents our conclusions.
2 Interbank market in Japan
This section provides an overview of the interbank market in Japan
and describes the 1997–98 banking crisis.1) To characterize the
1) We refer to Morita and Hara (1996) regarding trade practices in the
interbank market in Japan. Hoshi and Kashyap (2001, pp.267–304) provide
a detailed description of this banking crisis.
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interbank market, we focus on the call loan market.2) Figure 1 shows
the daily average outstanding balances in the call loan market from
1995 to 1998. These balances declined from 42 trillion yen in 1995 to
37 trillion yen in 1998.
In 1995, and similarly, in 1996 and 1997, unsecured overnight loans,
unsecured longer-term loans, and secured loans accounted for 42%,
36%, and 22% of the outstanding balance, respectively. However, in
1998, these figures were 42%, 32%, and 26%, respectively, indicating
that unsecured longer-term loans were replaced by secured loans in
that year.
In unsecured transactions, money market brokers (Tanshi gaisha)
play an important role in bringing borrowers and lenders together. A
money market broker finds a lender that meets a borrower’s needs
2) The Tegata (bill discount) market is another interbank market in Japan.
However, most of the Tegata transactions were related to the BOJ’s market
operations in the late 1990s.
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with respect to the amount borrowed, interest rate, and maturity.
The lender, on learning the borrower’s name, refers to a limit on
the amount that may be lent to that borrower. It is common in
unsecured transactions for lenders to set such limits according to each
borrower’s risk. The lender offers the loan only if it does not exceed
the borrower’s limit.
The 1997–98 crisis was caused by a significant increase in bad loans
owing to the collapse of land prices in the early 1990s.3) The solvency
of Japanese banks was seriously undermined by the considerable losses
associated with loan write-offs. Some major banks failed during the
crisis, an unprecedented incident in postwar Japan. The first wave
of the crisis was triggered by a series of failures of major financial
institutions (Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities) in
November 1997.4) The first crisis ended in March 1998, when the
government injected 1.8 trillion yen into major banks.
The second wave started in June 1998, when it was revealed that
the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, a major recipient of capital from
the government, was in serious trouble. The government nationalized
this bank in October 1998, and in December 1998, nationalized Nippon
Credit Bank, another troubled, major bank. Then, the government
injected another 7.5 trillion yen into major banks in March 1999, thus
ending the second crisis.
The interbank market, especially the market for longer-term loans,
was under severe stress during the crisis. Figure 2 shows a monthly
time series of the spreads between the unsecured and secured call
3) As on March 31, 1998, the total bad loans were about 30 trillion yen, or
5.9% of Japan’s GDP. See Hoshi and Kashyap (2001, pp. 281–283).
4) The call loan market saw the first postwar default, owing to the bankruptcy
of Sanyo Securities in early November 1997. This event also shocked the
interbank market participants.
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rates. One is the spread for the one-month call rate, and the other,
for the overnight call rate. These spreads are calculated from the
average market rates on unsecured and secured call loans published by
the BOJ.5) As the first wave of the crisis unfolded, the spread for
the one-month call rate rose fivefold, from 16 basis points in October
1997 to 78 basis points in December 1997. This dramatic increase
suggests that the shocking failures of several major financial institutions
had plunged the interbank market into turmoil. Although the spread
declined temporarily after the government’s capital injection in March
1998, the second wave of the crisis hit the interbank market. In June
1998, the spread for the one-month call rate began rising gradually and
in December 1998, reached its peak of 47 basis points. Then, it began
to decline as the government’s plans for the second round of capital
injection progressed. In March 1999, the spread finally returned to its
pre-crisis level, when the government injected capital into major banks.
In contrast, the spread for the overnight call rate was very stable
over the same period. This phenomenon might have been driven by
the belief that an overnight transaction with a very short maturity
represented a low risk. In addition, the unsecured overnight call rate
is the operating target of the BOJ in setting monetary policy. Thus,
the BOJ’s operations might also have contributed to the stability of
the overnight call rate.
In summary, the crisis had serious impacts on longer-term transactions,
but not on overnight transactions. Such sharp differences between
long-term and overnight transactions are consistent with Taylor and
5) Unfortunately, the BOJ does not publish average market rates for secured
one-month call loans. Instead, we use the average rates of the bids and
offers for treasury bill repurchase agreements (TB gensaki) with a one-month
maturity. The data are available from the Nikkei Needs Financial Quest.
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Williams’ (2009) study of the 2007–08 financial crisis.
3 Data and method
We analyze semiannual data from publicly traded banks during the
period starting from the second half of fiscal year 1995 (H2FY1995) up
to the second half of fiscal year 1998 (H2FY1998).6) The sample period
covers two distinct stages: the pre-crisis period (H2FY1995–H1FY1997)
and the crisis period (H2FY1997–H2FY1998). Six failed banks are
6) The first half of a fiscal year (H1) runs from April to September, and the
second half (H2), from October to the following March. We set the start
of the sample period to H2FY1995, when many people became suspicious
about the creditworthiness of Japanese banks after the first bank failure in
postwar Japan. In August 1995, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) announced
the liquidation of Hyogo Bank, the largest second-tier regional bank.
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excluded from our sample because we focus on solvent banks. We also
discard 11 banks that experienced mergers and acquisitions or were
newly listed during the sample period. These procedures leave us with
103 banks.
We obtained data on the amounts and interest rates of interbank
borrowing and lending from the financial statements of each bank. We
collected other financial data from the Nikkei Needs Financial Quest.
See the Data Appendix for more details.
It should be noted that our data on interbank transactions have
some limitations. First, we cannot break down the data on interbank
transactions into secured and unsecured transactions and overnight
and longer-term transactions. Thus, the data represent aggregated
transactions with different collateral requirements and maturities.
Second, we cannot obtain data on the collateral requirements and
maturities of interbank transactions. These limitations may affect the
estimation results. We discuss this point later.
The purpose of our study is to clarify the source of the interbank
market disruption during the crisis by examining the relationship
between the interbank borrowing (lending) terms and the characteristics
of borrower (lender) banks. We adopt a reduced form approach to
estimate the relationship between the amount and spread of interbank
borrowing (lending) and the characteristics of borrower (lender) banks.
This approach is common in the literature (Furfine, 2002; Afonso et
al., 2011; Angelini et al., 2011). First, we estimate the following probit
model for borrower access to the interbank market:
Accessit = α11Xit + α12(Crisis Period ∗ Xit) + α13Past Accessi
+α14(Crisis Period ∗ Past Accessi) + α15Crisis Period
+α16H1 + ε1it, (1)
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where the subscripts i and t denote a borrower bank and a time
period, respectively. The dependent variable Access is a binary variable
that takes a value of one when a bank borrowed and zero otherwise. X
is a vector of the characteristics of a borrower bank and is composed
of MBR, Ln(Asset), and Liquidity. MBR denotes the market-to-book
ratio of a bank’s equity.7) This variable is included as a measure of
bank risk. It is not easy to obtain a reliable measure of the Japanese
banks’ health in the late 1990s. Many researchers note that the
reported capital ratio, which was subject to manipulation by banks,
did not reflect their true conditions (Hosono and Sakuragawa, 2005;
Peek and Rosengren, 2005; Amiti and Weinstein, 2011).8) Instead,
those researchers recommend using information about bank stock prices
to measure bank health. Following Amiti and Weinstein (2011), we
use the market-to-book ratio of equity as a measure of bank risk.
Ln(Asset) is the logarithm of a bank’s total assets (Asset) at the
beginning of each period.9) Liquidity is a bank’s deposit-to-loan ratio
at the beginning of each period.10) This variable is included to control
for a bank’s interbank borrowing demand. Past Access is a dummy
variable that takes a value of one if a bank borrowed in H1FY1995
(the period just prior to the sample period) and zero, otherwise. Crisis
Period is a vector of time dummies for the crisis periods (H2FY1997,
H1FY1998, and H2FY1998). The H2FY1997 period covers the first
7) To obtain the market value of each bank’s equity, we multiply the number of
outstanding shares and the average share price in each period. The average
share price is calculated using the opening and closing prices in each month.
8) The nonperforming loan ratio may be a more reliable measure of bank
health, but consistent data for measuring this ratio are not available owing
to frequent changes in the definition of a nonperforming loan.
9) Actually, we use the value at the end of the previous period.
10) The definition of deposit includes bank debentures for long-term credit banks,
and borrowings from trust accounts for trust banks and three other banks.
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crisis, while H1FY1998 and H2FY1998 cover the second crisis. H1 is a
dummy variable for the first period of each fiscal year. This variable
is included to control for the seasonality of interbank transactions. ε1
is the error term. Equation (1) also includes region dummies.11)
Next, we estimate the following model for the amount and spread of
interbank borrowing:
Borrowit = α21Xit + α22(Crisis Period ∗ Xit) + α23Crisis Period
+α24H1 + ε2it, (2)
where the dependent variable Borrow can represent the borrowed
amount or the borrowing spread. We follow Afonso et al. (2011)
regarding the form of the dependent variable. For the amount borrowed
by each bank, we use the logarithm of the daily average outstanding
balance of interbank borrowing.
For the borrowing spread, we subtract the policy rate from the
interest rate paid by each bank.12) The interest rate is the average
value for each period, which is calculated by dividing the interest
expense on interbank borrowing by the daily average outstanding
balance of interbank borrowing. The explanatory variables are the
same as in equation (1) except that the Past Access variable and its
interaction terms are not included. ε2 is the error term.
It should be noted that many Japanese banks did not borrow from
11) The region dummies include Tohoku, Kanto, Chubu, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku,
and Kyushu. The base is Hokkaido. We do not include bank type dummies,
because many observations would be dropped in the probit estimation. For
example, city banks always borrowed during the sample period. Thus, the
city bank dummy perfectly predicts the outcome.
12) In the late 1990s, the BOJ implemented monetary policy by operating the
unsecured overnight call rate. However, the BOJ did not announce its target
rate until September 1998. Thus, we use the market average rate for an
unsecured overnight call loan as a proxy for the policy rate.
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the interbank market. For example, in H2FY1996, 26 banks out of a
total of 103 did not borrow from the interbank market. Thus, the
estimates of equation (2) can be affected by sample selection biases,
when we use only the observations with interbank borrowing. To check
for this possibility, we also use the Heckman sample selection model.
We also estimate the model for the amount and spread of interbank
lending as follows:
Lendit = α31Zit + α32(Crisis Period ∗ Zit) + α33Crisis Period
+α34H1 + ε3it, (3)
where the dependent variable Lend can represent the amount lent
or the lending spread. For the amount lent by each bank, we use
the logarithm of the daily average outstanding balance for interbank
lending. For the lending spread, we subtract the policy rate from the
interest rate charged by each bank. Z is a vector of the characteristics
of a lender bank and is composed of MBR, Ln(Asset), Liquidity, and
Non-borrowing bank. Non-borrowing bank is a dummy variable that
takes a value of one for 20 regional banks that borrowed from the
interbank market less than three times during the sample period.
Equations (2) and (3) also include region dummies as well as bank
type dummies.13) ε3 is the error term.
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables.14) The results
are reported separately for the pre-crisis period (H2FY1995–H1FY1997)
and the crisis period (H2FY1997–H2FY1998). The frequency of access
by borrowers is not different in the pre-crisis and crisis periods. The
amount borrowed decreased in the crisis period, although its mean
13) The bank type dummies include city banks, long-term credit banks, trust
banks, and second-tier regional banks. The base is first-tier regional banks.
14) In the following analysis, we exclude some observations in the top 1% of
borrowing spreads, lending spreads, or MBR.
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value is not statistically significantly different from that in the pre-crisis
period. The borrowing spread increased sharply during the crisis
period. Surprisingly, the amount lent increased during the crisis period,
although the mean value is not statistically significantly different from
that in the pre-crisis period. This result seems to be inconsistent with
the trend for the amount borrowed. One reason for this discrepancy
may be that during the crisis period, interbank lenders shifted their
lending away from Japanese banks toward foreign banks that did not
suffer from the problem of bad loans.15) The lending spread sharply
increased in the crisis period, as did the borrowing spread. The MBR
and liquidity of banks declined in the crisis period. The size of bank
assets did not differ in the pre-crisis and crisis periods.
4 Empirical results
Table 2 presents results illustrating the relationship between bank
risk and access to interbank borrowing. Column (1) presents the probit
estimate of equation (1), in which the dependent variable is a binary
variable that equals one when a bank borrowed from the interbank
market. In column (2), we use the Instrumental Variable (IV) probit
method to control for the potential endogeneity of MBR. A borrower
bank’s MBR can be correlated with the error term, if unobserved
liquidity shocks affect the bank’s stock price. We solve this potential
endogeneity problem by employing the one-period lagged MBR as an
instrumental variable. The lagged MBR should be correlated with the
current MBR, but not with current liquidity shocks.
The coefficients on MBR and its interaction terms with crisis period
15) The daily average outstanding balance of call loans borrowed by foreign
banks increased from 1.5 trillion yen in the pre-crisis period to 4.0 trillion
yen in the crisis period. The data are available from the BOJ.
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dummies, which are the variables of interest, are hardly statistically
significant. In column (2), only the coefficient on MBR*H2FY1997 is
statistically significant. However, the Wald test reveals that the sum
of the coefficients on MBR and MBR*H2FY1997 is not significantly
different from zero. Thus, we find no relationship between borrower risk
and access to the interbank market in the pre-crisis and crisis periods.
Column (1) of Table 3 reports the OLS estimates of equation (2), in
which the dependent variable is the logarithm of the amount borrowed.
Column (2) reports the IV estimation result using the lagged MBR as
an instrumental variable for MBR.16) Column (3) reports the Fixed
Effects (FE) estimates, for which we control for the unobservable fixed
effects of each borrower. In columns (4) and (5), we present the
results from the Heckman two-step selection model in order to verify
the robustness of the results of columns (1) to (3), which use only the
observations with interbank borrowing.
No coefficient on MBR is statistically significant. Thus, we find no
relationship between a borrower’s risk and the amount borrowed before
the crisis. This result suggests that the lenders were not sensitive to
counterparty risk during that period. In contrast, most coefficients on
the interaction terms between MBR and crisis dummies are positive and
statistically significant. In particular, the coefficient on MBR*H2FY1997
is statistically significant in all the estimates. The Wald test shows
that the sum of the coefficients on MBR and MBR*H2FY1997 is
positive and statistically significant in most regressions.17) This means
that riskier banks (banks with a lower MBR) borrowed less from the
16) The Cragg–Donald Wald F-statistic is large (98.6), which suggests that the
weak instruments problem does not occur. See Stock and Yogo (2005) for
details.
17) Although the sum of the coefficients on MBR and MBR*H2FY1997 is not
significant in the FE estimate, the p-value is 0.101.
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Ln(Asset)*H1FY1998 0.484 ** 0.619 **
(0.209) (0.258)
Ln(Asset)*H2FY1998 0.490 *** 0.567 ***
(0.144) (0.168)








Past access 1.867 *** 1.821 ***
(0.264) (0.261)
Past access*H2FY1997 0.220 0.232
(0.371) (0.371)
Past access*H1FY1998 -0.660 * -0.639 *
(0.352) (0.348)






H2FY1998 -3.520 ** -3.710 **
(1.501) (1.583)
H1 -0.277 ** -0.338 **
(0.122) (0.139)
Wald test
MBR + MBR*H2FY1997=0 0.04 0.20
MBR + MBR*H1FY1998=0 0.19 0.61
MBR + MBR*H2FY1998=0 0.07 0.10
Region dummies Yes Yes
Bank type dummies No No
Pseudo R
2 0.38






Access is a binary variable that takes a value of one when a bank borrowed and zero otherwise. Asset is a bank's total 
assets at the beginning of each period. Liquidity is a bank's deposit-to-loan ratio at the beginning of each period. Past 
access is a dummy variable that takes a value of one when a bank borrowed in H1FY1995 (the period just prior to the 
sample period). H2FY1997, H1FY1998, and H2FY1998 are crisis period dummies. H1 is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one for the first period of each fiscal year to control for seasonality. We exclude some observations in the top 1% 
of borrowing spreads and MBR. Figures in parentheses are standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and bank level 
clustering. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table3   Estimation results for equation (2)
(Borrower characteristics)
MBR -0.031 -0.231 -0.346 -0.201 -0.142
(0.349) (0.459) (0.224) (0.345) (0.345)
MBR*H2FY1997 0.854 ** 1.133 ** 0.801 ** 1.111 *** 1.011 **
(0.423) (0.504) (0.310) (0.409) (0.399)
MBR*H1FY1998 0.876 0.896 1.006 *** 1.269 ** 1.134 **
(0.533) (0.615) (0.374) (0.565) (0.549)
MBR*H2FY1998 0.451 1.013 ** 0.658 ** 0.740 * 0.664
(0.396) (0.483) (0.295) (0.436) (0.403)
Ln(Asset) 2.745 *** 2.812 *** -2.475 2.150 *** 2.397 ***
(0.313) (0.327) (1.953) (0.227) (0.358)
Ln(Asset)*H2FY1997 -0.396 ** -0.496 ** -0.381 ** -0.469 ** -0.421 **
(0.185) (0.217) (0.170) (0.181) (0.173)
Ln(Asset)*H1FY1998 -0.052 -0.101 0.011 -0.225 -0.191
(0.204) (0.233) (0.181) (0.247) (0.233)
Ln(Asset)*H2FY1998 -0.160 -0.287 -0.044 -0.293 -0.297
(0.186) (0.220) (0.169) (0.190) (0.192)
Liquidity -4.951 *** -4.857 *** -0.831 -2.313 ** -4.041 ***
(1.503) (1.460) (1.622) (1.138) (1.538)
Liquidity*H2FY1997 -1.585 -1.658 -1.279 -2.275 ** -1.990 *
(1.206) (1.197) (1.023) (1.134) (1.183)
Liquidity*H1FY1998 -2.880 ** -2.865 ** 0.627 -2.629 * -2.864 **
(1.453) (1.388) (1.127) (1.390) (1.417)
Liquidity*H2FY1998 -0.478 -0.499 1.419 -1.028 -0.986
(1.538) (1.503) (1.130) (1.441) (1.477)
H2FY1997 3.546 * 4.022 * 3.115 4.596 ** 3.969 **
(2.059) (2.105) (1.884) (1.979) (1.986)
H1FY1998 1.715 2.001 -2.949 2.364 2.516
(2.869) (2.842) (2.510) (2.995) (2.974)
H2FY1998 0.277 0.564 -3.106 1.806 1.827
(2.864) (2.853) (2.335) (2.736) (2.828)
H1 -0.506 *** -0.487 *** -0.410 *** -0.333 ** -0.401 ***
(0.141) (0.134) (0.133) (0.140) (0.140)
Mills -2.047 *** -1.717 ***
(0.612) (0.650)
Wald test
MBR + MBR*H2FY1997=0 3.21 * 3.05 * 2.74 4.03 ** 3.63 *
MBR + MBR*H1FY1998=0 2.33 1.09 4.05 ** 3.93 * 3.32 *
MBR + MBR*H2FY1998=0 1.06 2.89 * 1.21 1.59 1.61
Region dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Bank type dummies Yes Yes No No Yes
R
2 0.709 0.134 0.714 0.722
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 98.6










Amount borrowed is the daily average outstanding balance of a bank's interbank borrowing. MBR is the 
market-to-book ratio of a bank's equity. Asset is a bank's total assets at the beginning of each period. Liquidity 
is a bank's deposit-to-loan ratio at the beginning of each period.  H2FY1997, H1FY1998, and H2FY1998 are 
crisis period dummies. H1 is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for the first period of each fiscal year 
to control for seasonality. Mills is the inverse Mills ratio obtained from equation (1).  We exclude some 
observations in the top 1% of borrowing spreads and MBR. Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and bank level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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interbank market during the crisis period, especially in H2FY1997.
The effect of a borrower bank’s risk on the amount borrowed is also
economically significant. For example, the sum of the coefficients on
MBR and MBR*H2FY1997 is 0.455 in the FE estimate. This means
that a one-standard-deviation decrease in MBR (0.47) is associated
with a 21.4% decrease in the amount borrowed in H2FY1997. Thus,
the borrowed amount is significantly related to each borrower’s risk
during the crisis. This relationship is not observed prior to the crisis.
Such sharply different results in the pre-crisis and crisis periods lend
support to the counterparty risk hypothesis proposed by Furfine (2001),
who argues that a sharp increase in lending sensitivity to borrower risk
plays a key role in the disruption of interbank markets during crises.
However, our finding does not support Flannery’s (1996) and Heider et
al.’s (2015) argument that crises can disrupt interbank markets owing
to serious information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. This
is because our result suggests that interbank lenders could discriminate
between high- and low-risk borrowers even during the crisis. Our result
is similar to the finding of Afonso et al. (2011) that the amount
borrowed became highly sensitive to borrower risk in the federal funds
market after the failure of Lehman Brothers.
As we mentioned, our data on interbank transactions have some
limitations. The data on the amount borrowed represent aggregated
transactions with different collateral requirements and maturities.
Moreover, we cannot control for the effects of such collateral
requirements and maturities, because of the lack of data. However,
we believe that our result would be robust regardless of such data
limitations. The failure to control for the effects of collateral
requirements and maturities should cover up the effect of bank risk
on the amount borrowed, because even high-risk banks could borrow
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more easily if they were to seek loans against collateral or for shorter
maturities. Thus, our result shows the lower bound of the effect of
bank risk on the amount borrowed. If we controlled for the effects
of collateral requirements and maturities, we could observe a stronger
relationship between bank risk and the amount borrowed.
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 4 present the OLS, IV, and FE estimates
of equation (2), in which the dependent variable is the borrowing
spread. Columns (4) and (5) report the estimates for the Heckman
sample selection model. We see no statistically significant coefficients
on MBR and its interaction terms with the crisis period dummies in
all the estimates. This result suggests that there is no relationship
between bank risk and the borrowing spread in the pre-crisis and crisis
periods, in sharp contrast to the result for the amount borrowed.
Table 5 presents results illustrating the relationships between lending
terms and lender characteristics. Columns (1) to (3) report the OLS,
IV, and FE estimates of equation (3), in which the dependent variable
is the logarithm of the amount lent.18) The positive coefficient on
MBR is statistically significant only in the FE estimate. In contrast,
the negative coefficients on MBR*H2FY1997 and MBR*H1FY1998 are
statistically significant in most estimates. The Wald test shows that
MBR often has negative and significant effect on the amount lent in
H2FY1997 and H1FY1998. This result suggests that riskier banks
(banks with a lower MBR) lent more during the crisis. A lending
bank’s risk has an economically significant effect on its lending amount.
For example, the FE estimate suggests that a one-standard-deviation
decrease in MBR (0.47) is associated with a 26.6% increase in the
amount lent in H2FY1997.
18) We do not estimate the Heckman sample selection model, because there are
only five observations with no interbank lending.
— 44 —
Akiyoshi：Financial crisis and the interbank market: Japan’s banking crisis in 1997–98
Table4   Estimation results for equation (2)
(Borrower characteristics)
MBR -0.549 -3.552 -1.167 0.796 -1.011
(1.558) (2.383) (2.085) (1.659) (1.516)
MBR*H2FY1997 -0.196 3.513 -1.306 0.102 0.458
(3.568) (4.323) (3.329) (3.683) (3.550)
MBR*H1FY1998 0.357 0.596 2.357 0.513 1.434
(4.520) (4.668) (4.526) (4.649) (4.429)
MBR*H2FY1998 -3.361 1.594 -1.515 -4.734 -2.476
(3.025) (3.725) (3.371) (3.381) (3.112)
Ln(Asset) -0.808 0.255 -43.639 -2.862 ** -2.256
(2.017) (2.099) (28.613) (1.348) (2.143)
Ln(Asset)*H2FY1997 2.547 1.156 1.839 2.655 2.445
(1.611) (1.871) (1.438) (1.626) (1.621)
Ln(Asset)*H1FY1998 0.315 -0.394 -1.107 0.481 -0.264
(2.288) (2.182) (1.922) (2.361) (2.257)
Ln(Asset)*H2FY1998 2.776 1.293 2.431 3.366 2.209
(2.104) (2.188) (1.904) (2.295) (2.207)
Liquidity -11.427 -9.998 14.795 -3.731 -7.635
(7.575) (7.298) (21.864) (5.462) (7.691)
Liquidity*H2FY1997 -6.054 -6.979 -2.585 -11.786 -7.740
(14.435) (14.223) (13.951) (14.564) (14.548)
Liquidity*H1FY1998 -58.998 *** -58.719 *** -45.107 *** -59.469 *** -58.934 ***
(13.275) (12.295) (12.403) (13.324) (13.217)
Liquidity*H2FY1998 -46.682 *** -47.297 *** -34.631 *** -48.959 *** -48.799 ***
(13.176) (12.912) (11.158) (13.099) (13.251)
H2FY1997 -5.924 0.798 -1.022 0.173 -4.163
(25.673) (25.818) (23.097) (25.656) (25.854)
H1FY1998 74.679 ** 78.820 *** 69.868 *** 74.588 ** 78.017 ***
(29.010) (27.357) (24.602) (29.487) (28.947)
H2FY1998 46.111 51.682 * 34.646 46.707 52.565 *
(30.176) (29.251) (24.893) (31.143) (31.010)
H1 0.520 0.796 1.752 0.761 0.956
(1.075) (1.019) (1.362) (1.171) (1.169)
Mills -6.567 -7.150 *
(4.080) (4.199)
Wald test
MBR + MBR*H2FY1997=0 0.05 0.00 0.65 0.06 0.03
MBR + MBR*H1FY1998=0 0.00 0.38 0.09 0.08 0.01
MBR + MBR*H2FY1998=0 1.42 0.27 0.83 1.35 1.13
Region dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Bank type dummies Yes Yes No No Yes
R
2 0.227 0.237 0.206 0.237
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 98.6












Borrowing spread is the difference between the interest rate on a bank's interbank borrowing and the policy 
rate. MBR is the market-to-book ratio of a bank's equity. Asset is a bank's total assets at the beginning of each 
period. Liquidity is a bank's deposit-to-loan ratio at the beginning of each period.  H2FY1997, H1FY1998, 
and H2FY1998 are crisis period dummies. H1 is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for the first 
period of each fiscal year to control for seasonality. Mills is the inverse Mills ratio obtained from equation (1).  
We exclude some observations in the top 1% of borrowing spreads and MBR. Figures in parentheses are 
standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and bank level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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This result appears to be inconsistent with the hypothesis that
emphasizes the role of liquidity hoarding in the interbank market
disruption. As shown in Table 3, riskier banks could borrow less from
the interbank market and faced higher funding risks in the crisis period.
Thus, riskier banks, which became more subject to liquidity shocks,
should have tried to aggressively hoard liquidity and decrease their
lending levels. However, the observed relationship between lender risk
and the amount lent is contrary to the prediction.19) This interesting
behavior of riskier banks might be based on their strategies. Afonso et
al. (2011) find that lenders with large amounts of non-performing loans
increased their number of counterparties after the failure of Lehman
Brothers. They point out that this behavior might be caused by the
strategies used by risky banks to disguise their risk.
We also examine the effects of Liquidity in order to evaluate
the validity of the liquidity hoarding hypothesis. The coefficient on
Liquidity is positive and statistically significant in most regressions.
Banks with more liquidity lent more aggressively in the pre-crisis
period. In columns (1) and (2), the coefficient on Liquidity*H2FY1997
is statistically significant but has a negative sign. This sign is the
opposite of the prediction by the above hypothesis that the amount
lent would be more sensitive to lender liquidity during the crisis period.
Another variable of interest is Non-borrowing bank. The dummy
variable takes a value one for 20 regional banks that had engaged in
little or no borrowing from the interbank market. If the liquidity
hoarding hypothesis were to hold, we would observe positive and
statistically significant coefficients on the interaction terms between
Non-borrowing bank and the crisis period dummies. This is because
19) We obtain a similar result when we examine only banks that always borrowed
from the interbank market during the sample period.
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Table5   Estimation results for equation (3) 
(Lender characteristics)
MBR 0.197 0.065 0.383 ** 1.771 1.245 -1.176
(0.224) (0.281) (0.169) (1.138) (1.747) (1.618)
MBR*H2FY1997 -0.564 * -0.403 -0.948 *** -0.055 -0.533 0.810
(0.306) (0.335) (0.315) (2.881) (3.122) (2.678)
MBR*H1FY1998 -0.571 * -0.770 ** -0.865 *** 3.841 4.508 4.972 *
(0.322) (0.388) (0.326) (2.645) (3.563) (2.604)
MBR*H2FY1998 -0.341 -0.152 -0.705 ** 3.258 6.929 ** 5.812 *
(0.303) (0.372) (0.298) (3.100) (3.268) (3.127)
Ln(Asset) 0.337 * 0.375 ** -1.513 1.963 ** 2.067 ** 6.105
(0.171) (0.173) (2.560) (0.966) (0.838) (14.104)
Ln(Asset)*H2FY1997 0.177 0.122 0.182 2.912 *** 2.888 *** 2.835 ***
(0.136) (0.149) (0.118) (1.027) (0.932) (0.965)
Ln(Asset)*H1FY1998 -0.123 -0.128 -0.145 4.054 *** 3.829 *** 3.978 ***
(0.180) (0.188) (0.149) (1.080) (1.002) (1.070)
Ln(Asset)*H2FY1998 0.020 -0.035 -0.064 4.110 *** 3.680 *** 4.262 ***
(0.167) (0.184) (0.130) (1.180) (1.165) (1.203)
Liquidity 3.017 *** 3.065 *** 0.155 8.110 * 8.301 * 34.336 ***
(0.837) (0.798) (1.070) (4.358) (4.458) (11.666)
Liquidity*H2FY1997 -0.760 * -0.790 * -0.650 11.018 * 11.419 * 10.767 *
(0.458) (0.445) (0.442) (6.571) (6.359) (6.029)
Liquidity*H1FY1998 -0.815 -0.767 -0.950 -1.523 -1.642 -1.224
(0.820) (0.783) (0.843) (7.451) (7.312) (7.634)
Liquidity*H2FY1998 -0.663 -0.682 -0.717 10.545 10.742 9.042
(0.881) (0.849) (0.822) (8.727) (8.473) (9.096)
Non-borrowing bank 0.882 *** 0.879 *** -2.103 ** -2.099 **
(0.163) (0.156) (0.870) (0.847)
Non-borrowing bank*H2FY1997 -0.249 ** -0.252 ** -0.190 -1.926 -1.908 -2.188
(0.125) (0.117) (0.133) (1.658) (1.611) (1.630)
Non-borrowing bank*H1FY1998 -0.318 * -0.295 * -0.319 * -2.300 -2.317 -2.156
(0.170) (0.176) (0.172) (1.763) (1.706) (1.674)
Non-borrowing bank*H2FY1998 -0.357 ** -0.361 ** -0.325 * -1.568 -1.742 -1.751
(0.168) (0.160) (0.166) (2.318) (2.250) (2.284)
H2FY1997 0.763 1.005 0.991 -30.224 *** -30.065 *** -30.026 ***
(0.786) (0.784) (0.768) (10.067) (9.766) (9.368)
H1FY1998 3.115 *** 3.317 *** 3.834 *** -28.138 ** -27.228 ** -29.520 **
(1.136) (1.140) (1.143) (11.570) (11.442) (11.561)
H2FY1998 1.674 1.867 2.758 * -39.465 *** -40.848 *** -41.397 ***
(1.374) (1.331) (1.406) (13.999) (13.497) (14.877)
H1 0.331 *** 0.340 *** 0.242 *** 0.435 0.474 1.433 **
(0.068) (0.065) (0.070) (0.373) (0.350) (0.613)
Wald test
MBR + MBR*H2FY1997=0 2.24 1.78 3.49 * 0.36 0.06 0.02
MBR + MBR*H1FY1998=0 1.97 4.88 ** 2.48 3.97 ** 2.7 2.38
MBR + MBR*H2FY1998=0 0.58 0.16 1.25 2.85 * 8.3 *** 2.5
Region dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Bank type dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
R
2 0.312 0.157 0.409 0.337
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 167.8 167.8
Number of Obs 700 700 700 700 700 700
Ln(Amount lent) Lending spread
FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV FE OLS IV
Amount lent is the daily average outstanding balance of a bank's interbank lending. Lending spread is the difference between the 
interest rate on a bank's interbank lending and the policy rate. MBR is the market-to-book ratio of a bank's equity. Asset is a bank's 
total assets at the beginning of each period. Liquidity is a bank's deposit-to-loan ratio at the beginning of each period. Non-
borrowing bank is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for the 20 regional banks that borrowed from the interbank market 
less than three times during the sample period. H2FY1997, H1FY1998, and H2FY1998 are crisis period dummies. H1 is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one for the first period of each fiscal year to control for seasonality. We exclude some observations in 
the top 1% of lending spreads and MBR. Figures in parentheses are standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and bank level 
clustering. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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non-borrowing banks, which are insulated from funding risks, would
decrease their interbank lending less aggressively in crises. Thus,
we should observe a greater difference in the amount lent between
non-borrowing banks and other banks. However, the result is not
contrary to that prediction. We observe that most coefficients on the
interaction terms between Non-borrowing bank and the crisis period
dummies are statistically significant but negative. This result suggests
that the difference between non-borrowing banks and the other banks
decreased during the crisis.
Columns (4) to (6) present the OLS, IV, and FE estimates of
equation (3), in which the dependent variable is the lending spread.
The positive coefficients on MBR*H1FY1998 and MBR*H2FY1998 are
statistically significant in some regressions. The Wald test shows that
the positive effect of MBR on the lending spread is often statistically
significant in H1FY1998 and H2FY1998. This means that riskier banks
(banks with a lower MBR) charged a lower lending spread in these
periods. This result might also indicate the strategies used by high-risk
banks to disguise their risk.20)
5 Robustness checks and discussion
We find that riskier banks borrowed less from the interbank market
during the crisis period. This finding is consistent with the counterparty
risk hypothesis, which argues that interbank lenders are so sensitive to
borrower risk that high-risk borrowers are not able to obtain sufficient
funds from the interbank market. However, the finding from the
20) However, this result should be treated with caution. We see no significant
relationship between MBR and the lending spread, when we examine only
banks that always borrowed from the interbank market during the sample
period.
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reduced-form estimation, in which we try to control for demand effects,
leaves room for a different interpretation: riskier banks reduced their
demand for liquidity during the crisis period.
We now check the validity of this demand-side hypothesis. Specifically,
we focus on the BOJ’s discount window lending during the crisis. The
BOJ pumped a massive amount of liquidity into the interbank market
in response to the crisis. Figure 3 shows the daily average outstanding
balances of the discount window lending by the BOJ. In H2FY1997,
the BOJ granted loans of more than four trillion yen to banks facing
difficulty in borrowing from the interbank market. This event provides
a unique opportunity to test the validity of the two hypotheses. The
demand-side hypothesis predicts that riskier banks relied less heavily
on the provision of liquidity by the BOJ during the crisis period. In
contrast, the counterparty risk hypothesis predicts that riskier banks
relied more heavily on such provision. To test these predictions, we use
the data on the amount of loans granted by the BOJ to each bank.
Table 6 presents results illustrating the relationship between bank
characteristics and the amount borrowed from the BOJ.21) Column
(1) reports the probit estimate in which the dependent variable is
a binary variable that equals one when a bank borrowed from the
BOJ.22) We find that riskier banks (banks with a lower MBR) borrowed
from the BOJ more frequently during the crisis period, especially
21) A bank’s financial statements report the amount of interbank borrowing and
debt, separately. We define the amount of debt as the amount of debt
from the BOJ. It should be noted that our data can include debt from
financial institutions other than the BOJ. Thus, our data might also reflect
the borrowings from financial institutions with close ties to each bank. To
focus on active interbank borrowers, we use the banks that borrowed from
the interbank market in more than three periods.
22) We do not report the IV probit estimate treating MBR as an endogenous
variable, because the estimation fails to converge.
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in H2FY1997. The coefficient on MBR*H2FY1997 is negative and
statistically significant. The Wald test shows that the sum of MBR
and MBR*H2FY1997 is significantly different from zero. Although the
positive coefficient on MBR*H1FY1998 is statistically significant, the
Wald test shows that the sum of MBR and MBR*H1FY1998 is not
significantly different from zero.
Columns (2) to (4) report the OLS, IV, and FE estimates in which
the dependent variable is the logarithm of the amount borrowed from
the BOJ.23) The results show that riskier banks (banks with a lower
MBR) borrowed more from the BOJ in H2FY1997. The negative
coefficient on MBR*H2FY1997 is not statistically significant in columns
(2) and (3). However, the Wald test shows that the sum of MBR
and MBR*H2FY1997 is negative and statistically significant in both
23) We do not estimate the Heckman sample selection model, because a relatively
small proportion of banks did not borrow from the BOJ.
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regressions.24) These results are consistent with the prediction of the
counterparty risk hypothesis and provide further evidence for the key
role of counterparty risk in disrupting the interbank market.25)
One possible concern is that our results might be affected by our
use of semiannual data on interbank transactions. Previous studies
used daily data on interbank transactions, which are not available to
us. However, we believe that the difference in data frequency does not
cause a serious problem because the banking crisis in Japan, especially
the first crisis, persisted for months, due to the sluggish response of
the Japanese government. The first capital injection was implemented
in March 1998, about four months after the banking crisis erupted.
This contrasts sharply with the prompt response of the US government
to the financial crisis beginning in September 2008. It took less than
two months for the US government to implement the first capital
injection after the failure of Lehman Brothers. There are two key
reasons why the Japanese government responded so sluggishly to the
crisis. First, major banks, fearing stigma, initially refused to receive
capital injections from the government. Second, policymakers, who
had been strongly criticized for using public funds to liquidate the
jusen (housing loan companies), hesitated to use public funds again
to recapitalize banks.26) Delaying the capital injection prolonged the
crisis in Japan. As a result, the first crisis lasted from November 1997
to March 1998, corresponding to most of H2FY1997. Thus, the use of
semiannual data should not seriously affect our finding of relationship
24) We obtain no significant effect in the FE estimation. This might be because
the BOJ’s operation would significantly affect the future values of MBR,
which leads to the failure of the strict exogeneity assumption.
25) Afonso et al. (2011) examine bank access to discount window lending and
report a similar result.
26) See Hoshi and Kashyap (2010) for the details.
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Table6   Estimation results for the BOJ's discount window lending
(Borrower characteristics)
MBR -1.334 * -0.299 -0.570 -0.004
(0.728) (0.331) (0.456) (0.079)
MBR*H2FY1997 -0.497 *** -0.357 -0.270 0.029
(0.190) (0.264) (0.301) (0.128)
MBR*H1FY1998 0.565 * 0.122 0.055 0.133
(0.291) (0.308) (0.365) (0.149)
MBR*H2FY1998 0.520 0.308 0.571 0.180
(0.463) (0.334) (0.428) (0.170)
Ln(Asset) 1.642 *** 1.816 *** 1.935 *** -0.585
(0.435) (0.359) (0.367) (0.850)
Ln(Asset)*H2FY1997 -0.024 -0.128 -0.208 -0.040
(0.221) (0.122) (0.140) (0.084)
Ln(Asset)*H1FY1998 -0.170 ** -0.294 *** -0.350 ** -0.060
(0.083) (0.109) (0.140) (0.060)
Ln(Asset)*H2FY1998 0.572 -0.716 *** -0.845 *** -0.239 **
(0.527) (0.222) (0.251) (0.099)
Liquidity 2.263 -5.211 *** -5.098 *** -0.540
(2.099) (1.236) (1.195) (0.560)
Liquidity*H2FY1997 2.983 * -2.073 *** -2.055 *** -1.319 **
(1.515) (0.593) (0.591) (0.544)
Liquidity*H1FY1998 -0.639 -2.824 *** -2.822 *** -1.288 *
(0.755) (0.692) (0.692) (0.654)
Liquidity*H2FY1998 0.368 -3.191 *** -3.295 *** -1.783 ***
(1.377) (0.746) (0.725) (0.644)
H2FY1997 -3.027 3.788 *** 4.222 *** 1.834 *
(2.978) (1.315) (1.292) (1.019)
H1FY1998 1.012 5.276 *** 5.736 *** 1.669
(1.394) (1.308) (1.375) (1.017)
H2FY1998 -5.659 9.105 *** 9.873 *** 3.812 ***
(4.106) (2.248) (2.260) (1.426)
H1 -0.031 -0.134 -0.113 -0.011
(0.141) (0.083) (0.085) (0.037)
Wald test
MBR + MBR*H2FY1997=0 4.91 ** 5.21 ** 4.96 ** 0.04
MBR + MBR*H1FY1998=0 1.19 0.34 1.70 0.66
MBR + MBR*H2FY1998=0 1.91 0 0.00 0.95
Region dummies No Yes Yes No





) 0.527 0.733 0.139
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 79.3










We use the banks that borrowed from the interbank market in more than three periods. Access is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one when a bank borrowed from the BOJ. Amount borrowed 
is the daily average outstanding balance of a bank's debt from the BOJ. MBR is the market-to-book 
ratio of a bank's equity. Asset is a bank's total assets at the beginning of each period. Liquidity is a 
bank's deposit-to-loan ratio at the beginning of each period. H2FY1997, H1FY1998, and H2FY1998 
are crisis period dummies. H1 is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for the first period of 
each fiscal year to control for seasonality. Figures in parentheses are standard errors corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and bank level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 
5, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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between borrowers’ risk and the borrowing terms in H2FY1997.
The authorities took several measures to cope with the crisis. We
now briefly discuss the effects of these measures on the interbank
market. First, the government injected capital into major banks in
March 1998. Our analysis shows mixed results on the ability of the
capital injection to stabilize the interbank market. We find that
high-risk banks did not rely on liquidity provided by the BOJ after
the capital injection (H1FY1998 and H2FY1998), which suggests that
the interbank market returned to stability. However, we still find a
relationship between the bank risk and the amount borrowed after the
capital injection. Such mixed results sharply contrast with the result
of Afonso et al. (2011). They report that the effect of bank risk on
the amount borrowed, which became stronger owing to the failure of
Lehman Brothers, returned to pre-crisis levels after the announcement
of the plan to bail out AIG. Our mixed results might be driven by
the fact that the first capital injection in March 1998 wat too small to
solve the crisis. By June 1998, it was apparent that the first capital
injection was not sufficient to stabilize the Japanese banking system.
Then, the interbank market experienced its second crisis. These events
might have led to the mixed results for the period after the capital
injection.
Second, in November 1997, the government began to guarantee the
safety of all interbank transactions. However, we observe a significant
effect of bank risk on the amount borrowed in H2FY1997. This
result suggests that this policy failed to ease lender concerns about
counterparty risk.
As mentioned above, the BOJ provided substantial liquidity to the
interbank market during the crisis. Our results suggest that this policy
by the BOJ was not sufficient to stabilize the interbank market. Indeed,
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we find some evidence suggesting a disruption in the interbank market
in H2FY1997, although the BOJ aggressively pumped liquidity into
this market during that period. However, we find that high-risk banks
relied heavily on the BOJ’s discount window lending in H2FY1997.
This result shows that the BOJ played an important role as a lender
of last resort for high-risk banks that could not borrow sufficient funds
from the interbank market.
6 Conclusion
We examined the interbank market in Japan during the 1997–98
banking crisis. During the pre-crisis period, there were almost no
effects of bank risk on borrowing terms such as the amount borrowed
and the borrowing spread. However, during the crisis period, bank risk
had significant effects on the borrowing terms, especially the amount
borrowed: riskier banks borrowed less from the interbank market.
These results suggest that the interbank market disruption was largely
caused by an increase in the market sensitivity to counterparty risk.
In contrast, we found no evidence of liquidity hoarding by banks.
During the crisis, the amount lent did not become more sensitive to
lender liquidity and dependence on interbank borrowing. Our results
are similar to those of previous research, especially the results of
Afonso et al. (2011); this suggests there are common features in the
interbank market crises in Japan and the US.
Our findings have important implications for policymakers in coping
with crises in interbank markets. The provision of liquidity by
central banks is not sufficient to restore the function of interbank
markets. Instead, it is essential to dispel concerns about bank risk by
interventions such as capital injections into troubled banks.
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Data Appendix
The data on the amount and interest rate of interbank borrowing
(lending) are obtained from Shikin un’yo chotatsu kanjo heikin zandaka,
risoku, rimawari: kokunai gyomu bumon (average outstanding balances,
interest, and yield rate for assets and liabilities: domestic operations
division) in the interim and annual financial statements of each bank.
We calculate XH2, the daily average outstanding balance of interbank
borrowing for the second half of a fiscal year (182 days), as follows:
XH2 =
365 × XFY − 183 × XH1
182
, (A.1)
where XFY (XH1) is the daily average outstanding balance of interbank
borrowing for a fiscal year, i.e. 365 days (first half of a fiscal year, i.e.
183 days). The daily average outstanding balance of interbank lending
for the second half of a fiscal year is calculated in a similar way.
We calculate rH2, the interest rate of interbank borrowing for the







where ZFY (ZH1) is the interest expense for a fiscal year (first half
of a fiscal year). Note that the value of rH2 is annualized. The
interest rate of interbank lending for the second half of a fiscal year is
calculated in a similar way.
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